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Abstract
The design and veriﬁcation of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms is a complicated task. Usually,
the proof of correctness is done manually, and thus depends on the skill of the prover. Using auto-
mated veriﬁcation methods, such as model checking, can greatly simplify the veriﬁcation. However,
model checking of distributed algorithms is often intractable because of the state-explosion prob-
lem. In this paper we present a novel approach to veriﬁcation of quorum-based distributed register
emulation algorithms with undetectable crash failures of processes. Our approach is based on pro-
jection and abstraction and allows us to reduce the task of model-checking the whole system to fair
model-checking of subsystems consisting of a constant number of processes. Our method is highly
scalable and can be applied to a large class of algorithms. Aside from eﬃcient veriﬁcation, it can
also be used for ﬁnding redundancies in existing algorithms.
Keywords: Distributed algorithms, parametrized systems, fault-tolerance, crash failures, register
emulation, automatic veriﬁcation, model checking
1 Introduction
Formal veriﬁcation is widely recognized as a key means for assuring the correct
behavior of large and complex software systems. Such systems are usually
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distributed, and contain a large number of components, or processes, which are
subject to a variety of failures. Thus, distributed algorithms for such system
must be fault-tolerant. The design of such algorithms is a complex task, and
their manual proofs of correctness are usually very complicated. Automatic
veriﬁcation of such systems is limited by the state-explosion problem, which
becomes acute even for medium-size systems. Resent research in the area of
parametrized systems, that is, systems that consist of potentially numerous
instantiations of (usually) small and simple modules, uses techniques such as
abstraction and deductive veriﬁcation (see [9] for a survey). None of these
techniques deal with fault-tolerance.
In this paper, we consider asynchronous distributed systems with unde-
tectable crash failures of processes. We assume that there is a large number of
processes, which can be placed into a small number of “equivalence classes,”
e.g., readers, writers, and servers (that store the value of a shared data ob-
ject), so these systems can be regarded as parametrized systems. In a system
with undetectable crash failures, a failed process stops communicating with
the other processes, but the failure cannot be detected by the others. That is,
a failed process is not distinguishable from one that is “very slow” [5]. We do
not consider Byzantine failures, where a failed process can behave arbitrarily,
and in particular, can deviate from its algorithm.
The distributed algorithms that we consider emulate shared registers and
are based on quorum systems. In quorum systems, every broadcast operation
awaits acknowledgments from only a quorum of processes, rather than from
all processes. There exist diﬀerent types of quorum systems. The common
feature of all quorum systems is that an intersection of every two quorums
is nonempty. Taking this feature as an axiom, we abstract away a particu-
lar quorum system. We propose a method for modeling and veriﬁcation of
quorum-based concurrent algorithms with crash failures by means of fully au-
tomatic model-checking procedures. Informally, our method is as follows. We
express correctness (safety and liveness) properties of systems by quantiﬁed
LTL formulae. We then show that the quantiﬁcation over processes can be
replaced by quantiﬁcation over subsystems, each of which contains a constant
number of processes and executes a constant number of requests, while main-
taining semantic equivalence of the formulae. Model checking these small
subsystems then suﬃces to conclude the correctness of the whole system. In
general systems, we have to verify all possible subsystems, and since the num-
ber of subsystems is exponential in the number of processes, the veriﬁcation
cannot be done automatically for an arbitrary number of processes. The key
idea, which allows us to check only a small number of subsystems, is that the
systems we consider consist of a small number of “equivalence classes” of sim-
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ilar processes. Two processes are placed in the same equivalence class if they
run the same algorithm and are in the same state at the present time in the
execution. Since server processes store the value of the register, the current
value stored in a server is also taken into account when checking equivalence
Algorithms that we study in this paper use unbounded time-stamps. Thus,
the straightforward implementation of each process yields a structure with an
inﬁnite number of states. However, since we only deal with subsystems with
a constant number of processes, and quorum-based decisions are based solely
on comparison between time-stamps (and not on their absolute values), we
are able to abstract the absolute values of time-stamps away and to use only
their relative values. Since the number of requests in subsystems is constant,
the number of time-stamps is also constant, and thus we are able to express
their comparative values by a constant number of boolean variables.
When we construct subsystems, we project the processes onto the subsys-
tem, abstracting away all states that are unreachable and all variables that
are unaccessible in this subsystem. The main problem in projecting the pro-
cesses is that in a large system, processes perform transitions depending on the
quorum-based decisions. Since in a constant-size subsystem a quorum of pro-
cesses is inaccessible, we replace quorum-based decisions by non-deterministic
decisions. This replacement creates illegal executions which do not exist in the
original system. The ﬁrst type of illegal executions is executions in which the
client process non-deterministically moves to a state where the output is cho-
sen before receiving the most updated reply. We ﬁlter such executions away by
always including a process in the intersection of the current quorum with all
other quorums in the small subsystem that we model-check. The second type
is executions in which processes are stuck in the “waiting-for-replies” state and
never terminate. We ﬁlter such executions away by replacing regular model-
checking with fair model-checking, where the fairness constraint eﬀectively
expresses the condition “there is always a live quorum of processes”.
An additional advantage of model-checking small subsystems is didactic.
That is, the necessity of a part of the algorithm can be easily veriﬁed by
removing this part from the model and model-checking the altered subsystem.
If the altered subsystem still satisﬁes the desired property (non-vacuously), it
means that the removed part was not necessary for the correctness of the
algorithm.
P.C. Attie, H. Chockler / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 149 (2006) 49–60 51
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Temporal logic and Kripke structures
In model checking, we check whether a system given as a Kripke structure
(labeled state-transition graph) satisﬁes a speciﬁcation given as a temporal
logic formula (or a ﬁnite automaton). In this paper we assume that the spec-
iﬁcations are given in the linear temporal logic LTL [8,4]. The semantics of
temporal logic is deﬁned with respect to Kripke structures. We use Bu¨chi fair-
ness constraints, where an execution is fair if it visits a fair state an inﬁnite
number of times.
2.2 Registers
A read/write register (or simply, register) type supports an arbitrary set V als
of values with an arbitrary initial state vo ∈ V als. Its invocations are read
and write(v), for some v ∈ V als. Its responses are v and ack. Its sequential
speciﬁcation f requires that every write operation overwrites the last value
written and returns ack (that is, f(write(v), w) = (ack, v)); and every read
operation returns the last value written (that is, f(read, v) = (v, v)). In a
system consisting of processes P1, P2, . . ., a process Pi interacts with a shared
register by means of input actions of the form readi and writei(v) and output
actions of the form vi and ack. A read/write register is called k-reader/m-
writer if only k processes are allowed to read, and m processes are allowed
to write the register. We use the term multi-reader (multi-writer) when the
number of readers (writers) is unrestricted. We now deﬁne several register
properties. In our deﬁnitions, we talk about read and write operations. As
opposed to I/O actions (which are atomic by deﬁnition), operations start when
the request is placed in the system and terminate when the result is returned:
the result of a read operation is a value and the result of a write operation is
an indication that a write has terminated successfully.
When expressing the register properties in quantiﬁed LTL, we denote by ri
the i-th read operation, by wi the i-th write operation, and by si the i-th server.
In order to express the order between processes, we introduce new boolean
variables for beginning and end of each operation: opi.b (opi.e) changes from
false to true when the ﬁrst (last) action of opi is executed. We use Lamport’s
notation of arrows to express order between processes [7], where op1 → op2
(op1 strictly precedes op2) is a shortcut for G(op2.b ⇒ op1.e), and op1 ↔ op2
(op1 is concurrent with op2) is a shortcut for ¬(op1 → op2) ∧ ¬(op2 → op1),
and ⇒ denotes boolean implication. We also use variables wi.val for a value
written by wi, ri.val for a value read by ri, and si.val for a value that si holds.
The values are pairs of the data value and a time-stamp, that is, opi.val =
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〈v, ts〉. When comparing between values, we say that opi.val = op
′
j .val iﬀ
opi.val.v = op
′
j.val.v and opi.val.ts = op
′
j .val.ts. Let x be a register, and let
σ be a sequence of invocations and responses of x. The following deﬁnitions
of registers in a single-writer multi-reader system are taken from [7].
• Safe register: σ is safe if every complete read operation that does not
overlap any write operation returns the latest written value or the initial
value if no value has been written yet. A register x is safe iﬀ all its traces
σ are safe. Formally,
∀wi, r : G[ (wi → r) ∧ (¬∃wj : wi → wj → r) ∧ (¬∃wk : wk ↔ r)⇒
F(r.val = wi.val) ]. (1)
We note that we only express the condition of correct value returned when
there are previous writes. When there are no previous writes, the require-
ment is expressed trivially.
• Regular register: σ is regular if it is safe and in addition every read
operation that overlaps some write operations returns either one of the
values written by overlapping writes or the latest non-overlapping value. A
register x is regular iﬀ all its traces σ are regular. Formally, this additional
requirement is expressed as
∀wi, r : G[ (wi → r) ∧ (¬∃wj : wi → wj → r) ⇒
F(r.val = wi.val) ∨ ∃wk : (wk ↔ r ∧ F(r.val = wk.val)) ]. (2)
• Atomic register: σ is atomic if it is regular and in addition all invocations
of σ are linearizable (see [6] for a deﬁnition) to a sequential register (that
is, a register in which there are no overlapping operations). A register x
is atomic iﬀ all its traces σ are atomic. Formally, a register is atomic if it
satisﬁes Equation 2 and in addition
∀w1, w2, r1, r2 : G[ ((r1 → r2) ∧ F(w2.val = r1.val) ∧ F(w1.val = r2.val))⇒
¬F(w1 → w2) ]. (3)
For the purposes of this work, we consider an operation to be live if the
terminating state is eventually reached (that is, Fop.e holds).
2.3 Characterization of algorithms
We start by characterizing the class of algorithms R to which our method
applies. The characterization of R is as follows.
(i) Algorithms in R emulate a shared register by numerous instances of
server processes.
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(ii) There is a single writer process 3 .
(iii) Servers can crash and stop responding to requests. However, there is
always a live quorum of servers.
(iv) Clients (writers and readers) are non-faulty.
(v) Each server can hold exactly one value at each point.
(vi) All values are accompanied by (unique) time-stamps.
(vii) Upon receiving diﬀerent replies from servers, the output answer is chosen
based on the time-stamps of the replies.
We do not restrict the number of rounds each client performs in order to
read/write a value. We do assume, however, that this number is constant.
Each invocation of the algorithm (whether a read or a write) can be ver-
iﬁed in isolation from the previous invocations. This observation allows us
to model invocations by micro-processes [2]. A micro-process implements a
single operation (e.g., a single read or write), after which it is destroyed. It
has a very few states, and thus systems consisting of micro-processes can be
easily model checked. The only problem with micro-processes is that a writer
should store the current time-stamp. We circumvent it by assuming that the
time-stamp is given to the writer micro-process as an input together with
the input value. In single-writer algorithms, we can safely assume that this
input time-stamp is unique and increases with each subsequent request. In
multi-writer algorithms, more subtle reasoning is needed.
3 Automatic Veriﬁcation of Quorum-Based Register Em-
ulations
In this section, we present our main result, namely, that the desired safety
and liveness properties can be automatically veriﬁed in small subsystems and
the correctness of the whole system deduced from the correctness of these
subsystems. This result follows from Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2.
Lemma 3.1 Safety properties of algorithms from R can be veriﬁed by model
checking of a ﬁnite number of subsystems which contain a constant number of
readers and writers.
Essentially, we prove that the temporal formulas that express the cor-
rectness properties of the register can be rewritten in the prenex way with
universal quantiﬁers only. The pure LTL part of the formula involves at most
3 Our work can be extended to the multi-writer case. For multiple writer processes, addi-
tional work should be performed in order to prove uniqueness of the time-stamp.
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4 clients. The resulting pure LTL formulas are
ϕsafe = G[ (wi → r)∧¬(wi → wj → r)∧¬(wk ↔ r)⇒ F(r.val = wi.val) ] (4)
for safe register,
ϕregular = G[ (wi → r) ∧ ¬(wi → wj → r)⇒
F(r.val = wi.val) ∨ (wk ↔ r ∧ F(r.val = wk.val)) ] (5)
for regular register, and
ϕat = G[ ((r1 → r2)∧F(w2.val = r1.val)∧F(w1.val = r2.val)) ⇒ ¬F(w1 → w2) ]
(6)
for atomic register. Since we model clients by micro-processes, each of which
executes exactly one request, the number of requests in a subsystem is equal
to the number of clients in this subsystem. We are not done yet, since it
remains to prove that we are able to consider a constant number of servers as
well.
Lemma 3.2 The subsystems in Lemma 3.1 can be constructed with a constant
number of servers. The number of servers participating in a single subsystem
is bounded by 2m, where m is the number of communication rounds between a
client (reader or writer) and servers in this subsystem.
The proof is based on the observation that at any given time during the
execution there is a constant number of equivalence classes of servers. Since
the decision is made based on the time-stamp and not the number of replies
with the same value, we need only one representative from each equivalence
class to be included in a subsystem. Since each communication round divides
the set of servers by 2 (into servers that responded and servers that did not
respond in this round), m rounds divide the set of servers by 2m.
We note that Lemma 3.2 assumes that the current value is stored in a state
of a server. This results in an unbounded number of states in the large system.
In the constant-size subsystems that we consider, however, the number of
values is is constant, and thus only a ﬁnite number of states of each server
is reachable. We abstract away unreachable states. The number of rounds
depends on the algorithms for readers and writers. For example, a reader
micro-process can perform two communication rounds with the servers, where
in the ﬁrst one it reads the value and in the second one it writes it to the
servers. We further note that the set of servers that did not reply to any of
the clients can be ignored, as it does not play any role in the correctness of
the system.
Combining Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 we are able to verify safety and
liveness properties of algorithms by model-checking a constant number of sub-
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systems with a constant number of (small) processes. It remains to show how
quorum-based decisions are projected onto small subsystems. We do so by
replacing quorum-based transitions by non-deterministic transitions. Clearly,
such abstraction creates executions that are illegal in the global system. First,
a process can now loop indeﬁnitely in the state where it awaits replies from
a quorum, thus creating a non-terminating execution. Second, it is now al-
lowed to move to the state where it chooses the output value regardless of the
number of replies it received.
We deal with the ﬁrst problem by replacing the standard model checking
procedure with fair model checking, where the fairness constraint allows only
executions in which the state where a process awaits replies from a quorum
occurs only a ﬁnite number of times. This is equivalent to the assumption that
there is always a live quorum of servers. We deal with the second problem by
a careful construction of the product Kripke structure. In our product Kripke
structure, we want to eliminate all executions which are not consistent with
receiving a quorum of replies. We rely on the deﬁnition of quorum systems,
which postulates that every two quorums intersect. Thus, we construct the
small subsystems so that for every pair of communication rounds in the sub-
system, we include a single server process that lies in the intersection of the
quorums of these two rounds. This ensures that the correct safety properties
for this pair of rounds are veriﬁed, since they are enforced by this server.
Time-stamps Algorithms for register emulation usually use unbounded
time-stamps. Fortunately, since our subsystems consists of a constant number
of processes and a constant number of communication rounds is used, we are
able to abstract away unbounded time-stamps. For correctness properties of
safe, regular, and atomic registers in the single-writer systems it suﬃces to
use 2 boolean variables for encoding the time-stamps. Indeed, the number
of values written in the small subsystems does not exceed 4 for any of these
properties.
Fine tuning Our previous reasoning allows us to reduce veriﬁcation of a
parametrized system to model-checking subsystems with a constant number
of processes. We showed that it suﬃces to consider a subsystem with m
communication rounds and 2m servers. In fact, we can reduce the number
of servers in the subsystem to m(m − 1)/2 (the number of pairs of rounds).
Indeed, the only servers that are essential for the proof of correctness of the
algorithms in R are the ones in the intersections of quorums of a read and a
write communication round.
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4 Examples
In this section we illustrate our method on examples of algorithms that emulate
a shared read/write register. We start with a simple example of a safe register
in a single-writer multi-reader system. Then we extend it to the algorithm
presented by Attiya et al. in [3].
The following codes of the client and server processes implement the safe
register under the single writer assumption in a system in which there always
exists a majority of live processes [7].
writer(〈M〉):
increase T imeStamp;
count := 0;
send 〈M,T imeStamp〉 to all;
upon receiving a reply ack do
count := count + 1;
until count > n/2,
where n is the number of processes;
return;
server(〈M〉):
upon receiving 〈M〉 do:
case 〈M〉:
〈M〉 = ReadRequest:
send 〈M,T imeStamp〉;
〈M〉 = 〈m,T imeStamp〉:
if T imeStamp > LocalT imeStamp,
then update M ;
send ack;
reader():
count := 0;
send 〈ReadRequest〉 to all;
upon receiving a reply
〈M,T imeStamp〉 do
count := count + 1;
save 〈M,T imeStamp〉;
until count > n/2,
where n is the number of processes;
choose the message M
with the maximal
time-stamp MaxT imeStamp;
return 〈M,MaxT imeStamp〉;
Recall that safe registers satisfy Equation 4, which is checked in subsystems
of three writer processes and one reader process. Since each writer process
invokes one write request and the reader process invokes one read request,
there are 3 pairwise intersections of quorums of a write and a read requests,
and thus 3 server processes in the subsystem. Moreover, there are three values
written in this subsystem. Thus, the order between the three time-stamps
can be expressed by three boolean predicates: p1 ≡ (wi.val.ts > wj.val.ts)
and p2 ≡ (wi.val.ts > wk.val.ts), and p3 ≡ (wj .val.ts > wk.val.ts). Since
the system has one (global) writer process, in the product subsystem the
three write requests should strictly precede each other. Also, we do not have
to consider the order in which wi → wj → r. The projection of a single
write request (that is, a micro-process) and the projection of a single read
request onto a subsystem with a constant number of processes are presented
in the ﬁgures below. We assume that the correct time-stamp is given to the
writer micro-process together with the input value (that is, val is a tuple
〈v, ts〉). The projection is obtained by abstracting away all variables that
are unaccessible in the subsystem and computing the quotient abstraction
of the resulting structure. The transitions w1 → w2 and r1 → r2 are non-
deterministic. Recall, that we ensure liveness of the subsystem by replacing
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regular model-checking with fair model-checking and safety by including the
server that lies in the intersection of quorums in the subsystem. The server
process stores the current value and its time-stamp in its state. Since in our
subsystem there are three write requests, the projection of a server process
onto a subsystem has a ﬁnite number of states. The projection of a server
process on the subsystem with three write operations is presented in Figure 1.
s0
s∅
s.b = 1 read()
s2
write(val1)
write(val3)write(val2)
s′
2
s1
s′
1
s3
s′
3
Projection of a server on the subsystem
write(val2),¬p1
write(val1), p1
send(init− val)
read()
send(val1)
w1
w2
ack()w0
Projection of write(val) on the subsystem
input(val)
w.b := 1
send(val)
return
ack
(maj reached)w.b := 0
w.e := 1
Projection of read() on the subsystem
readreq
r.b := 1
r0
send(req)
r1
ack(val)
r2
return(o)
ack(val)
(maj reached)
o := maxval
r.e := 1
r.b := 0
(maxval is the value with the maximal time-stamp)
Fig. 1. Projection of processes in the safe register emulation
To avoid cluttering the ﬁgure, we omitted transitions similar to the ones
between s1 and s2 and between s1 and s
′
1. All projections end in the idle state
(omitted from the ﬁgure), in which they loop forever. The resulting subsystem
is a product of 7 processes and has 3 write requests. The largest process is,
thus, a server, whose size depends on the number of write requests. In this
case, it has 8 states (2 states for each value, an initial state, and a state in
which the initial value is returned). Thus, the straightforward implementation
results in a subsystem that can be encoded with 21 variables. Filtering away
interleavings that result in a vacuous satisfaction of the property and noting
that replies from servers are assumed to be received in a known order results
in a subsystem, which is the cross-product of a sequential composition of 3
clients and 2 servers (which has in total 25 states), one client (the writer wk)
and one server (which lies in the intersection of the quorums of wk and r).
Together with time-stamps, this subsystem can be encoded using 12 boolean
variables, which is well within the reach of modern model-checkers.
The algorithm of Attiya et al. [3] for emulating a regular register in single-
writer multi-reader asynchronous message-passing systems with crash failures
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diﬀers from the example we studied above in the code of the reader process.
In this algorithm, the reader process performs two rounds: one read request
and then one write request with the value received from the read request. The
projection of the reader micro-process onto a subsystem is presented in the
ﬁgure below. This diﬀerence leads to the atomicity of the register. Recall,
that atomicity is expressed by Equations 5 and 6.
Equation 5 is checked in a subsystem
of three writer micro-processes and one
reader micro-process. Note that the reader
issues one read request and one write re-
quest, therefore the subsystem contains 4
server processes. The largest process in
the subsystem is a server, which has 10
states, and thus the resulting subsystem
can be encoded using at most 30 boolean
variables.
readreq
r.b := 1
r0
send(req)
r1
r2
r3
send(o)
ack(val)
ack(o)
r4
ack(val)
(maj reached)
return(o)
r.e := 1
r.b := 0
Projection of read() on the subsystem
(maxval is the value with the maximal time-stamp)
o := maxval
Equation 6 is checked in a subsystem of two writer and two reader micro-
processes. The subsystem contains 8 servers, thus the resulting subsystem
can be encoded using at most 44 boolean variables. For both properties,
applying the reasoning above further reduces the size of the subsystem.
The neccessity of the second round of read By abstracting away
the second round of read and model-checking the resulting subsystem, we can
show that in order to ensure the property of always returning the last preceding
write value or a concurrent write value we only need one round of read. On the
other hand, two rounds of read are essential for proving atomicity. Indeed, we
can construct a subsystem with two writes combined sequentially and a read
concurrent with the last write, in which Equation 5 holds, with automatically
generated interesting witnesses to exhibit both types of satisfaction: there is
an execution in which the read returns the value written by the ﬁrst write, and
another execution in which the read returns the value written by the second
write. Since this is true for both reads regardless of their order, there exists
an execution in which the ﬁrst read returns the value of the second write and
the second read returns the value of the ﬁrst write.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We proposed a method for modeling and veriﬁcation of distributed algorithms
for register emulation that allow crash failures of less than a quorum of servers.
We argued that correctness (safety and liveness) properties of the whole system
can be automatically model-checked in subsystems of constant size and then
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extrapolated to the whole system. We avoided examining quorums of processes
by replacing quorum-based transitions with non-deterministic transitions, and
we showed how to ﬁlter away illegal executions that are created by using non-
determinism. Modeling and automatically verifying distributed algorithms by
means of small abstracted systems may help to determine what parts of the
algorithm are really essential for its correctness by abstracting away a part
in question and model-checking the resulting system. While the examples
we considered in this paper are fairly simple, we believe that applying these
methods to more complex algorithms may lead to interesting insights and even
improvements of existing algorithms.
It remains to prove formally that correctness of small subsystems that we
constructed implies the correctness of the whole system. The formal frame-
work for these proofs is provided by the pairwise representation of concurrent
systems [1]. The method of [1] can be generalized from analyzing products of
pairs of processes to analyzing products of small numbers of processes.
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